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Double Auctions with No-Loss Constrained Traders∗
Nejat Anbarci† Jaideep Roy‡
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Abstract
Do hard budget constraints work in favour or against truthtelling in double auctions? McAfee
(1992) constructed a simple double auction mechanism (MDA), which is strategyproof and
minimally inefficient, but may resort to dual prices, where the difference between prices is
channelled as a surplus to the market maker, preventing MDA from achieving a balanced budget.
We construct a variant of MDA in which No-Loss Constraints play a major positive role. Our
variant of MDA is also strategyproof, as efficient as MDA but improves on it by achieving a
balanced budget via always having a uniform price.
Keywords: No-Loss Constraint (NLC), double auctions (DA), uniform price, efficiency, bal-
anced budget, sunspots.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, D62.
1 Introduction
Trade in most important homogeneous-goods markets has been governed primarily by periodic
systems in the form of a ‘double auction’ (DA) for more than hundred-fifty years. They are used
to open many continuous markets such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the Tokyo Stock
Exchange and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. DAs collect bids and asks/offers from traders,
implicitly construct supply and demand curves, announce a market-clearing price, and execute the
indicated trades. As such, DA comes closest to operationalising Marshall’s supply-demand diagram
among all institutions that mediate trade.
These markets are always in flux where investors need to make quick decisions, many of which
push them to eventual losses. In finance, in particular, it is well recognised that investors are prone
to becoming extra cautious in trying to avoid losses at almost all costs. This can encourage traders
∗We thank Sandro Brusco, Nick Feltovich, Takashi Kunimoto, Simon Loertscher, Preston McAfee, Arunava Sen,
Steven Williams and two anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions.
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to play it safe by never bidding above their private valuations and never asking below their private
costs. Hard budget constraints may be another reason for such cautious behaviour as traders may
have no means to face any amount of ex-post monetary loss. In this paper we use the weakest
form of such a constraint. In particular, while we allow traders to bid above their valuations or ask
below their costs, they are constrained from incurring any loss ex-post. Such traders will be called
No-Loss-Constrained (NLC) traders and will be the focus of this paper.
The main issue in the literature on DA is the tension between efficiency, incentive compatibility
and balanced-budget. As the famous impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)
suggests, under fairly general conditions, any double auction that is incentive compatible for both
the buyers and the sellers must yield a deficit if it wants to achieve ex-post efficiency. It is also well
known, for example, that the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (Vickrey (1965), Clarke (1971)
and Groves (1973)) achieves efficiency, individual rationality and incentive-compatibility but runs a
deficit. A question that becomes central then is: what can we achieve with a balanced budget DA?
Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) proposed a mechanism for bilateral trading where the buyer pays
the seller an average of their bids and nothing otherwise. The mechanism is balanced budget and
strategyproof but not efficient. McAfee (1992), for instance, devised an ingenious yet simple DA
mechanism (MDA hereafter for the McAfee Double Auction) with single-unit demand and supply
that achieves strategyproofness, and is minimally inefficient (in the sense that it leaves out at most
the least efficient trading pair). Indeed it also avoids a budget deficit, but fails to have a balanced
budget via a uniform price, since MDA may use dual prices, where the difference between prices is
channelled as a surplus to the market maker.1
In this delicate context, it is far from clear whether NLC constraints alleviate this problem
or not. This is because it is not obvious how incentives to misreport may get affected in the
presence of NLC. We find that in a world with NLC traders, there exists a simple variant of MDA
that improves the performance of the mechanism: it not only remains strategyproof and equally
efficient as MDA but also has a uniform price - via a price lottery - and hence a balanced budget. In
a sense, this result highlights the crucial link of NLC to strategyproofness when DAs are concerned.
Indeed, MDA fails to be strategyproof if one uses our price lottery to achieve a uniform price in a
non-NLC world. As a consequence, since the surplus that would go to the market maker in MDA
gets channelled either to the buyers or to the sellers in our scheme (thus benefitting both sides
in expected sense without hurting either in ex-post sense), NLC traders would strictly prefer our
scheme to MDA.2 It is important to note that, instead of assuming NLC, if we assume stricter
1Matters get more complex with multiunit demands and supplies (as in Loertscher and Mezzetti (2014) or with
interdependent values (as in Kojima and Yamashita (2014)). For an excellent survey on the design of two-sided
markets, see Loertscher, Marx and Wilkening (2015).
2 We are thankful to Preston McAfee for sharing this observation with us. As in a world with NLC traders, MDA
maintains all its properties, it follows that in such a world our mechanism is more efficient than MDA in ex-ante sense
if welfare is utilitarian. However, as explained in Section 4, our mechanism ceases to be strategyproof in a world
where traders are not NLC.
2
restrictions where buyers never bid above their valuations or sellers never ask below their costs,
then our results continue to hold.3 Lastly, as we discuss further in the paper, randomness of the
price does not necessarily have to be a mechanism-design instrument. Instead, one may think of
a situation where the market maker is endowed with a private type that depicts whether she is
“pro-buyer” or “pro-seller”. The randomised price can then be determined by the realisation of this
type, giving rise to sunspots.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the DA market and in
Section 3 we define our DA mechanism. In Section 4 we state and prove our main result, followed
by a discussion. The paper provides its concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 The framework
The market : Following McAfee (1992), consider a market with N buyers, indexed by i ∈ NB =
{1, ..., N}, and M sellers, indexed by j ∈ N S = {1, ...,M}. Each buyer i has a privately observed
value bi for a single unit of a homogenous good while each seller j has a privately observed cost sj
for providing a single unit of the good. We assume unrestricted domains for values and costs as
long as they are non-negative, that is, bi, sj ≥ 0 for all i, j. We denote by (b, s) a profile of these
private values and costs (profile, in short). A buyer with value bi who obtains the object at price
p earns a payoff of ui = bi − p while a seller with cost sj who sells the object earns a payoff of
vj = p− sj . Both buyers and sellers earn zero when they are not able to trade. Buyers and sellers
privately report their bids and asks to the market maker who employs a Double Auction (DA) to
decide which buyers and sellers trade and at what prices. We denote a DA mechanism by M and
the reported profile by the pair (β, σ) where β = (β1, ..., βN ) and σ = (σ1, ..., σM ) are the reports
of the buyers and sellers respectively.
Volume of trade: Given a profile (b, s) and the order statistics b(1) > ... > b(N) and s(1) < ...., s(M),
the efficient number of trades is the number k ≤ min {N,M} such that b(k) ≥ s(k) and b(k+1) <
s(k+1). As in McAfee we too will call the traders identified with the number k as our marginal
traders and maintain that a DA mechanism dictates that a trade still occurs even if it produces
exactly zero surplus to either party. A minimally inefficient mechanism is one where the number
of trades is k − 1 with some probability and k with the remaining probability.
Price rule: Denote by T(β,σ) = B(β,σ) ∪ S(β,σ) the set of buyers (B(β,σ)) and sellers (S(β,σ)) who
trade at the reported profile (β, σ). Let piβ,σ : T(β,σ) → ∆ (R+) be the price rule that allocates a
price lottery piβ,σ (t) (that is a probability distribution over R) to trader t ∈ T(β,σ) at profile (β, σ).
For t ∈ T(β,σ), let pβ,σ (t) be the realized price for t under the lottery piβ,σ(t). Then t pays a price
3As pointed out by a referee, there are many implementations in experiments of private-values markets in which
bidding above value or below cost was ruled out by the decision interface.
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pβ,σ (t) and obtains a monetary payoff bt − pβ,σ (t) if t ∈ B(β,σ) while if t ∈ S(β,σ), then t receives
this price pβ,σ (t) and obtains a monetary payoff of pβ,σ (t)− st.
Properties of the mechanism: We say thatM has a uniform price rule at profile (β, σ) if piβ,σ (t) =
piβ,σ (t
′) for each t, t′ ∈ T(β,σ) and piβ,σ (t) determines the ‘market’ price from a draw, common to all
buyers and sellers. We call M a uniform price DA if M has a uniform price rule at each reported
profile (β, σ). We say that M has a balanced budget if the total monetary amount paid by all
buyers who trade equals the total monetary amount received by all sellers who sell at any reported
reported profile (β, σ), that is, ∀(β, σ), ∑t∈B(β,σ) pβ,σ (t) = ∑t∈S(β,σ) pβ,σ (t), for each pβ,σ(t) in
the support of piβ,σ (t), t ∈ T(β,σ). We say that M is No-Loss Constrained (NLC), if, ex post,
no trader is worse off by participating in the double auction than by not participating. As no
participation yields zero monetary payoff to the trader, then NLC simply means that in each state
of the world, each trader must obtain a non-negative monetary payoff: for each buyer t ∈ B(β,σ), we
have pβ,σ(t) ≤ bt for each pβ,σ(t) in the support of piβ,σ (t) and for each seller t′ ∈ S(β,σ), we have
pβ,σ(t
′) ≥ st for each pβ,σ(t′) in the support of piβ,σ (t′). We now define strategyproofness under
NLC. For a given report (β, σ), the expected payoff of buyer t ∈ B(β,σ) with true valuation bt is
Ut(β, σ) =
∫
pβ,σ(t)∈R+(bt− pβ,σ (t))piβ,σ(t)dpβ,σ (t) , the expected payoff of seller t ∈ S(β,σ) with true
cost st is Vt(β, σ) =
∫
pβ,σ(t)∈R+(pβ,σ (t) − st)piβ,σ(t)dpβ,σ (t) , while Ut(β, σ) = Vt(β, σ) = 0 for all
t /∈ T(β,σ). The mechanism is NLC-buyer-manipulable at a reported profile (β, σ) if the mechanism
respects the NLC conditions described above and there exists a buyer t ∈ NB and a bid βt 6= bt
such that Ut((β−t, βt), σ) > Ut((β−t, bt), σt). Similarly, the mechanism is NLC-seller-manipulable at
a reported profile (β, σ) if the mechanism respects the NLC conditions described above and there
exists a seller t ∈ SB and an ask σt 6= st such that Vt(β, (σ−t, σt)) > Vt(β, (σ−t, st)). The mechanism
is NLC-strategyproof if there does not exist a reported profile (β, σ) that is NLC-manipulable by
any buyer or seller.
Our objective is to find a minimally inefficient NLC-strategyproof mechanism that is budget-
balanced.
3 The mechanism
Consider the following mechanism denoted byMq : for any arbitrary report profile (β, σ), consider
the order statistics β(1) > ... > β(N) and σ(1) < ... < σ(M) where the subscripts (i) and (j) represent
the ranks for the buyers and sellers in these orderings respectively. Fix any probability q, with
0 < q < 1, and denote by p the uniform price. Of course, uniform price immediately makes the
mechanism budget-balanced.
Criterion 1 : If k = min{N,M}, then piβ,σ yields p = β(k) with probability q and p = σ(k) with probability
1− q and at the realized price all buyers with bids ≥ β(k−1) and all sellers with asks ≤ σ(k−1)
trade while the remaining traders stay out; volume of trade = k − 1;
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Criterion 2 : If k < min{N,M} and
(A) β(k) ≥ β(k+1)+σ(k+1)2 ≥ σ(k), then piβ,σ yields p =
β(k+1)+σ(k+1)
2 with probability 1 at which
all buyers with bids ≥ β(k) and all sellers with asks ≤ σ(k) trade while all other agents
stay out; volume of trade = k;
(B) either β(k) <
β(k+1)+σ(k+1)
2 or
β(k+1)+σ(k+1)
2 < σ(k), then piβ,σ yields p = β(k) with prob-
ability q and p = σ(k) with probability 1 − q and at the realized price all buyers with
bids ≥ β(k−1) and all sellers with asks ≤ σ(k−1) trade while all other players stay out; If
k = 1 then no trade takes place; volume of trade = k − 1;
Remark 1 (The McAfee Double Auction (MDA)) For a given reported profile (β, σ), define
p0 =
β(k+1)+σ(k+1)
2 . The MDA andMq coincide at each profile of reports (β, σ) such that β(k) ≥ p0 ≥
σ(k) where in both mechanisms all top k value buyers and bottom k cost sellers trade. On the other
hand, if p0 /∈ [σ(k), β(k)] the quantity traded is k − 1 in both the mechanisms, but in the MDA, all
buyers pay β(k) while all sellers are paid σ(k). In case of Mq, the realized price is uniform through
the price lottery pi(β,σ) over the binary set {σ(k), β(k)}. Our benchmark for minimal inefficiency is
MDA.
Remark 2 (Price-uncertainty and Sunspots) A useful modification of the mechanism Mq
would be to incorporate a binary state of the world which is observed by the market maker but
not by the participants. At its simplest, it could be the type of the market maker, who could be
“pro-buyer” (who sets p = σ(k)) or “pro-seller” (who sets p = β(k)) where now, q is the ex-ante
probability that the market-maker is “pro-seller.” This would eliminate uncertainty as an instru-
ment and would mean that the mechanism is in fact not random at all. The price would indeed be
uncertain from the perspective of the traders but this uncertainty would be more as a response to
‘sunspot’ variables (viz. the market-maker’s type), that is, to random events that have nothing to
do with economic fundamentals.4
4 The result
Theorem 1 For each q ∈ (0, 1), the budget-balanced uniform-price Mq is NLC-strategyproof and
as efficient as MDA.
Proof : Volumes of trade under each criterion in the definition of Mq prove that the efficiency of
Mq is that of MDA. So we prove NLC-strategyproofness. Fix an arbitrary q ∈ (0, 1). Denote by
(β, σ)i = ((β−i, bi), σ) a profile where buyer i bids truthfully while the bids and the asks of others
are arbitrary. Similarly, denote by (β, σ)j = ((β, (σ−j , sj)) a profile where seller j bids truthfully
while the bids and the asks of others are arbitrary.
4We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this to us.
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Case 1 k = min{N,M} (Criterion 1): Consider profile (β, σ)i and let k = min{N,M} = N (the
argument is analogous when min{N,M} = M). Then pi(β,σ)i is a lottery with p = β(N) with
probability q and p = σ(N) with probability 1− q but the buyer with bid β(N) and the seller with
ask σ(N) stay out while all other agents trade. It is not possible that buyer i with bi > β(N) can
affect the price without i becoming a marginal trader and earning 0, which is less than i’s payoff
of bi − β(N) > 0 that occurs with probability q or bi − σ(N) > 0 that occurs with probability 1− q.
So suppose bi = β(N) so that i is currently excluded and earns 0. Suppose i increases her bid to β
′
i
to be included in the market. This changes the lottery to one where the price is β(N−1) > bi with
probability q and σ(N) with probability 1− q, thus violating the NLC condition for buyer i.
Now consider profile (β, σ)j and let k = min{N,M} = N (the argument is again analogous
when min{N,M} = M). Then pi(β,σ)j is a lottery with p = β(N) with probability q and p = σ(N)
with probability 1 − q but the buyer with bid β(N) and the seller with ask σ(N) stay out while all
other agents trade. If sj < σ(N), then j cannot affect the price without herself becoming a marginal
seller who would earn 0. But as sj < σ(N) ≤ β(N), the current lottery pi ((β, (σ−j , sj)) yields payoffs
β(N) − sj > 0 with probability q and σ(N) − sj > 0 with probability 1 − q. So suppose sj ≥ σ(N)
so that seller j is currently excluded. If j bids some σi < sj to be included, then in the best case
scenario, she faces a lottery that assigns probability 1 − q on max{σj , σ(N)} that either makes j
indifferent with the deviation or violates her NLC condition. Thus we have shown that no profile
with k = min{N,M} is manipulable.
Case 2 k < min{N,M} (Criterion 2): Consider any profile (β, σ)i with k < min{N,M}. First
consider the case under Criterion 2(B) where either β(k) <
β(k+1)+σ(k+1)
2 or
β(k+1)+σ(k+1)
2 < σ(k) as
this case is similar to the first case studied. This generates the lottery pi(β,σ)i such that all buyers
with bids ≥ β(k−1) and all sellers with asks ≤ σ(k−1) trade at price β(k) with probability q and
σ(k) with probability 1− q, while all other players stay out. As before, if bi ≥ β(k−1) then there is
no profitable deviation as any such change can either not affect the price lottery or can throw the
buyer out of the market, while the current price lottery satisfies NLC. If bi < βk−1, then i can only
consider entry by bidding βi > bi, but in each such case, it is straightforward to see that the price
lottery would violate NLC for i. Similarly, consider any profile (β, σ)j and with k < min{N,M}
with either β(k) <
β(k+1)+σ(k+1)
2 or
β(k+1)+σ(k+1)
2 < σ(k) as before. If sj ≥ σ(k−1) then j is currently
out of the market and the only way to enter is by bidding σj < σ(k−1) ≤ sj that yields a strictly
negative payoff with probability 1− q and hence violates NLC. So suppose sj < σ(k−1). Then any
deviation either has no impact on prices or throws j out of the market.
Next consider the case under Criterion 2(A) where β(k) ≥ β(k+1)+σ(k+1)2 ≥ σ(k), where all buyers
with bids ≥ β(k) and all sellers with asks ≤ σ(k) trade at price p = β(k+1)+σ(k+1)2 and all other agents
stay out. Let the profile under consideration be (β, σ)i. Suppose bi > β(k). Then i cannot find a
deviation that can affect the price without throwing her out of the market. So suppose bi = βk.
By bidding below, she can only throw herself out of the market or keep the price unchanged, while
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bidding above has no impact. So let bi < βk so that buyer i is currently out of the market. The
only impactful deviations are βi > bi. Suppose first that bi = βk+1 and assume βi > β(k) (the
argument is analogous for bi ≤ β(k+2)). Note that before this manipulation attempt, it must be
that bi = βk+1 <
β(k+1)+σ(k+1)
2 since as non-trading agents, it must be that βk+1 < σ(k+1), for
otherwise they would be trading as marginal agents. Then, after i jumps over β(k), the original
marginal buyer, pushing this original marginal buyer out of the market, the new price becomes
β(k)+σ(k+1)
2 >
β(k+1)+σ(k+1)
2 > β(k+1) = bi, violating NLC. So assume that i’s deviation is such
that σ(k+1) ≤ βi < β(k), thereby including himself in the market. If this deviation implies that
βi ≥ β(k+2)+σ(k+2)2 ≥ σ(k+1), then the new price will be
β(k+2)+σ(k+2)
2 . And this will be beneficial if
and only if bi = β(k+1) >
β(k+2)+σ(k+2)
2 . But this implies this deviation with this resulting new price is
feasible and incentive compatible if and only if β(k+1) >
β(k+2)+σ(k+2)
2 ≥ σ(k+1), a contradiction with
the fact that β(k+1) < σ(k+1). On the other hand, if this deviation implies either βi <
β(k+2)+σ(k+2)
2
or
β(k+2)+σ(k+2)
2 < σ(k+1), then this deviation creates a lottery price where β(k+1) or σ(k+1) is the
price with probability q and 1− q but this buyer is left out of trade and earns 0. So there is again
no profitable deviation. Finally, consider the profile (β, σ)i. If sj < σ(k), then j cannot affect the
price without becoming the marginal seller and earning zero. If sj = σ(k) cannot improve by asking
more or asking less as by asking less, the only way to affect price is to become a non-trading seller.
The arguments for sj ≥ σk+1 > σ(k), so that she is currently the non-trading seller, is analogous to
the non-trading buyer’s case. This completes the proof.
5 Concluding discussion
Numerical examples: We begin with an example to demonstrate what the mechanism implements.
Let q = 1/2 and suppose there are 4 buyers with valuations b1 = 10, b2 = 8, b3 = 3, b4 = 1
and 5 sellers with costs c1 = 0, c2 = 1, c3 = 2, c4 = 8, c5 = 10. Here k = 3 < min{4, 5} and
(b4 + c4)/2 = 4.5 > b3, c3. Hence it is under Criterion 2(B). So the price lottery is p = 3 with
probability 1/2 and p = 2 with probability 1/2 at which buyers 1 and 2 and sellers 1 and 2 trade
while all other traders stay out. The market is minimally inefficient. If at the above profile c4
drops to 3 while all other values remain the same, then while k still remains 3, we now have
b3 = 3 > (b4 +c4)/2 = 2 ≥ c3 = 2. Hence we are under Criterion 2(A). The market price is p = 2 at
which buyers 1,2 and 3 and sellers 1,2 and 3 trade while all other players stay out. The market is
efficient. Finally, if the valuations for the buyers are b1 = 10, b2 = 9.5, b3 = 8.5, b4 = 8.25 while the
sellers’ costs remain as above, then k = 4 = min{4, 5} and we are under Criterion 1. In that case,
the price lottery is p = 8.25 with probability 1/2 and p = 8 with probability 1/2, at which buyers
1,2 and 3 and sellers 1,2 and 3 trade and the market is minimally inefficient. It is straightforward
to verify that no trader has a profitable deviation. The driving idea of the mechanism is that if one
picks βk as the price, then sellers can bid below cost without risk of loss, but buyers cannot bid
above their values. Similarly, if one picks σk as the price, then buyers can manipulate, but sellers
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cannot with risk of loss.
Mq without NLC : Mq is indeed not strategyproof in a world where traders are not NLC. To
see this, consider the case when it yields a price lottery of β(k) = 0.7 with probability q and
σ(k) = 0.5 with probability 1 − q. Suppose β(k−1) = 0.70001. Buyer (k) is currently not trading.
Suppose this buyer bids 0.70002. Then the buyer enters the market and faces the lottery that
yields 0.70001 with probability q and 0.5 with probability 1 − q. His expected monetary payoff is
q(0.70001− 0.70002) + (1− q)(0.7− 0.5) = (1− q)0.2− q0.00001. To block this deviation, we need
q > 0.99995. But the profile may be such that σ(k−1) = 0.49999 and if seller (k) who is currently
not selling bids 0.49998, then he enters the market and his expected monetary payoff from the new
price would be q(0.7−0.49999) + (1− q)(0.49999−0.49998) = 0. To block this deviation, we would
require q < 0.00004. Of course we can now find β(k+1) and σ(k+1) such that
β(k+1)+σ(k+1)
2 /∈ [0.5, 0.7].
For example, take β(k+1) = 0.65 and σk+1 = 0.9.
In general it is far from clear whether No-Loss Constraints faced by agents work in favour
or against truthtelling. We found that in the context of double auctions it works in favour of
truthtelling. In a world with No-Loss-Constrained traders, we have proposed a variant of MDA
that, like MDA, satisfies strategyproofness and is as efficient as MDA, but unlike MDA, is also
budget balanced with a uniform price. As a matter of fact, the crucial role of No-Loss Constraints
in our mechanism makes a uniform price possible through the use of a price lottery, which in turn
trivially ensures balanced budget. Without No-Loss Constraints, our uniform-price mechanism is
not strategyproof while McAfee’s mechanism is.
Our analysis has been in the context of single-unit demands and supplies. In a multi-unit setup,
if each unit has the same value or same cost to the respective buyer or seller, then modifications of
the mechanism with respect to number of units traded in equilibrium will keep the basic flavour of
our main result. When these valuations are different or when the good is not homogenous, matters
will get very complex and clearly beyond the present exercise (see Loertscher and Mezzetti (2016)
for more on this issue). Finally, note that although we found that in the context of double auctions,
No-Loss Constraints work in favour of truthtelling and help a price lottery achieve balanced budget
via uniform price, it does not have the power of going the full distance and making a mechanism
fully efficient.
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